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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

laudable goals of plea bargaining will be achieved, while preventing
a defendant from entering a guilty plea under any misconceptions.
Francis J. Coughlin, Jr.

Court of Appeals modifies Goggins standard for disclosure of informant's identity
The well-established prosecutor's privilege to withhold the
identity of a confidential informant188 often conflicts with a criminal
defendant's constitutional rights of confrontation and due process.189
In People v. Goggins,"'0 the Court of Appeals sought to resolve this
plea and the terms thereof. . . . The judge may not accept a plea of guilty or no
contest from a defendant without first determining that the plea is a product of
informed choice.
's Although the privilege is often said to belong to the informant, it "is in reality the
Government's privilege to withhold from disclosure the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with enforcement of that law." Roviaro v.
United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957). The prosecutor's right to preserve the anonymity of
informants was created by the courts in the interest of public policy, independently of any
statutory or constitutional mandate. See Note, Disclosureof an Informant's Identity - The
Substantive and ProceduralBalance Tests, 39 ALB. L. REv. 561, 564 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Informant's Identity]. See generally Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938).
"I'See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60 (1957). See also United States v. Agurs,
427 U.S. 97 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Cannon, Prosecutor'sDuty to
Disclose, 52 MARQ. L. Rxv. 517 (1969); Note, The Prosecutor'sDuty to DiscloseAfter United
States v. Agurs, 1977 U. OF ILL. L.F. 690, 690. The Roviaro Court held that the informant
privilege is overridden when "the dislcosure of an informer's identity, or of the contents of
his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a
fair determination of a cause. . . ." 353 U.S. at 60-61. This principle was to govern disclosure
in hearings to determine the existence of probable cause and in proceedings to establish the
defendant's guilt or innocence. Id.
New York cases initially indicated judicial reluctance to require disclosure of an informant's identity in probable cause cases. See People v. Cerrato, 24 N.Y.2d 1, 246 N.E.2d 501,
298 N.Y.S.2d 688 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 940 (1970); People v. Malinsky, 15 N.Y.2d
86, 209 N.E.2d 694, 262 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1965). The privilege was less consistently applied,
however, where disclosure was relevant to the determination of guilt itself. Compare People
v. Casiel, 42 App. Div. 2d 762, 346 N.Y.S.2d 349 (2d Dep't 1973) with People v. Jones, 76
Misc. 2d 547, 350 N.Y.S.2d 539 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1973). See generally W. RIcHARDSON,
EVIDENCE § 456 (10th ed. 1973). The probable cause line of cases culminated with People v.
Darden, 34 N.Y.2d 177, 313 N.E.2d 49, 356 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1974), in which the Court of
Appeals ruled that where the evidence, apart from the potential testimony of the informant,
fails to establish probable cause, the judge should examine the informant in an in camera
hearing and provide the defense with a "summary report" of the testimony. Id. at 181, 313
N.E.2d at 52, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 586. On the same day that Darden was decided, the Court
also decided People v. Goggins, 34 N.Y.2d 163, 313 N.E.2d 41, 356 N.Y.S.2d 571, cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1012 (1974), in which guidelines were established to govern disclosure when the
defendant's guilt or innocence is in issue. See note 191 infra. Distinguishing Goggins from
cases involving a determination of probable cause, the Court concluded that the ex parte, in
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conflict by ruling that an informant's identity must be disclosed
where the defendant has shown that the informant's potential testimony is relevant to the question of guilt or innocence.1"' In People
v. Peltak,1 2 the Court of Appeals recently held that disclosure is
required where the defendant raises an alibi defense and an informant is one of several prosecution witnesses placing him at the scene
of the crime. "' More significantly, the Court stated in dictum that,
even if the defendant had not met the Goggins standard, disclosure
should still have been granted unless the state made "some showing" of an interest in protecting the informant's identity." 4
The defendant in Peltak was indicted for selling narcotics to an
undercover agent." 5 Although two informants were present at the
restaurant-bar where the sale took place, and at least one informant
identified the defendant prior to the sale, it was unclear whether
either had actually observed the crime."' Contradicting the testimony of the agent and two officers who had accompanied him, the
defendant and six witnesses testified at trial that the defendant was
not in the restaurant-bar when the illegal exchange allegedly occurred." 7 To buttress his alibi defense, the defendant moved for
disclosure of the identities of the informants."' The motion was
denied, and the defendant subsequently was convicted."' The Apcamera proceiding was inappropriate, since the "defendant's right to the full benefit of the
adversary system should not be denied, nor qualified. . . by interposing the 'neutral' Judge
... 34 N.Y.2d at 169, 313 N.E.2d
to assess whether the disclosure is relevant or material.
at 44, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
1' 34 N.Y.2d 163, 313 N.E.2d 41, 356 N.Y.S.2d 571, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1012 (1974).
"' 34 N.Y.2d at 170, 313 N.E.2d at 45, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 576. The Goggins Court stated
that the defendant "must show a basis in fact to establish that his demand does not have an
improper motive and is not merely an angling in desperation for possible weaknesses in the
prosecution's investigation . . . ." Id. at 169, 313 N.E.2d at 44, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 575. Although the Court noted that the best case is made out for disclosure when the informant was
a participant in or an eyewitness to the crime, id. at 169-70, 313 N.E.2d at 44, 356 N.Y.S.2d
at 576, it also indicated that disclosure might be warranted where the informant's role was a
minor one but the other evidence was equally balanced, id. at 170, 313 N.E.2d at 45, 356
N.Y.S.2d at 576. The Court stated that "the truly crucial factor in every case is the relevance
of the informer's testimony to the guilt or innocence of the accused." Id.
192 45 N.Y.2d 905, 383 N.E.2d 556, 411 N.Y.S.2d 4 (1978), rev'g 54 App. Div. 2d 1051,
389 N.Y.S.2d 34 (3d Dep't 1976).
"3 45 N.Y.2d at 906, 383 N.E.2d at 557, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 5.
194 Id.
"1 54 App. Div. 2d at 1051, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 35. The defendant was charged with sale of
a dangerous drug in the fourth degree. See N.Y. PENAL LAw, ch. 1030, § 220.30, [1965] N.Y.
Laws 1654 (repealed 1973).
29 45 N.Y.2d at 906, 383 N.E.2d at 556, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 5.

Id.

197

199Id.
199Id.
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pellate Division, Third Department, affirmed the conviction, finding no "close identity question" requiring the testimony of the informants, since three officers had positively identified the defendant.m
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new
trial. 21 At the outset, the majority"' noted that a defendant may
become entitled to disclosure of an informant's identity either by
developing his defense or by exposing weaknesses in the prosecution's case. 213 Observing that the testimony of six witnesses corroborated the defendant's alibi,2 °4 the Court reasoned that disclosure was
warranted since the informants' testimony was relevant to the credibility of the alibi, which, in turn, was obviously relevant to the
ultimate question of guilt or innocence.0 '
Having found that the defendant had satisfied the Goggins
standard, the Court went on in dictum to state that even if this
standard had not been met, disclosure would have been mandated. 2°1 The Court noted that the prosecution had acknowledged
that the informants had been inactive for'over two years and that
the district attorney's office was unable to locate them. 27 Since the
defendant had "made [an] initial showing as to the importance of
disclosure," the Court concluded that the prosecution would "have
2
come forward with some showing" to support its claim of privilege. 1
In the Court's view, where the state's interest in preventing disclosure is "attenuated" when weighed against the probative significance of the informant's testimony, the informant should be identi2 09

fied.

In the time since Goggins was decided, the New York courts
have addressed informant disclosure questions in a variety of fac-

1®

54 App. Div. 2d at 1051-52, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 35. The appellate division found it

significant that "[n]either of the two informants introduced [the agent] to defendant or
was present when the illegal sale was negotiated or effectuated." Id.
1'45 N.Y.2d at 905, 383 N.E.2d at 556, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 4.
2' Judge Gabrielli dissented from the memorandum decision and voted to affirm on the
opinion of the appellate division. Id. at 907, 383 N.E.2d at 557, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 5 (Gabrielli,
J., dissenting).
- Id. at 906, 383 N.E.2d at 557, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 5 (quoting People v. Goggins, 34 N.Y.2d
163, 172, 313 N.E.2d 41, 46, 356 N.Y.S.2d 571, 578, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1012 (1974)).
234 45 N.Y.2d at 906, 383 N.E.2d 557, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 5. The Peltak Court noted that
additional evidence had been offered in support of the defense's position. Id.

SId.
'Id.

2w Id.
2G8 Id.
211 Id. at 907, 383 N.E.2d at 557, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 5 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 86-87 (1963)).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:803

tual settings. 10 The most important factors in interpreting the
Goggins standard have been the weight of the evidence against the
defendant"' and the role of the informant in the crime and arrest2 t2
2I There exist a multitude of cases on the issue whether an informant's testimony is
relevant to guilt or innocence. For examples, see People v. Singleton, 42 N.Y.2d 466, 368
N.E.2d 1237, 398 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1977); People v. Lee, 39 N.Y.2d 388, 348 N.E.2d 579, 384
N.Y.S.2d 123 (1976); People v. Leyva, 38N.Y.2d 160, 341 N.E.2d 546, 379 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1975);
People v. Pena, 37 N.Y.2d 642, 339 N.E.2d 149, 376 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1975); and People v.
Rodriguez, 62 App. Div. 2d 929, 403 N.Y.S.2d 275 (1st Dep't 1978). It may be that the frequent
reversals on appeal of disclosure determinations, see notes 211-212, infra, are attributable to
the delicate nature of the discretion committed to the trial judge, who does not enjoy the
benefit of hindsight in making the determination. In fact, the Goggins Court stated that
"[the Roviaro case . . . makes it clear that . . . the issue is one to be determined in the
exercise of a sound discretion by the Trial Judge." 34 N.Y.2d at 169, 313 N.E.2d at 44, 356
N.Y.S.2d at 575 (citation omitted). The Court's attempt to elaborate the basic considerations
involved is perhaps evidence that it was aware of the difficult task it was assigning to the
lower courts.
2I Disclosure of the informant's identity often is sought to challenge the prosecution's
proof on the issue of whether the defendant has been properly identified as the criminal. In
such cases, disclosure is warranted only where it is necessary to resolve a conflict in the
evidence. See People v. Singleton, 42 N.Y.2d 466, 368 N.E.2d 1237, 398 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1977);
People v. Pena, 37 N.Y.2d 642, 339 N.E.2d 149, 376 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1975); People v. Martin,
54 App. Div. 2d 624, 387 N.Y.S.2d 434 (1st Dep't 1976); People v. Simpson, 47 App. Div. 2d
665, 364 N.Y.S.2d 198 (2d Dep't 1975). Of course, disclosure may be ordered where it would
be helpful in breaking a deadlock on the question of guilt itself. See People v. Rodriguez, 62
App. Div. 2d 929, 403 N.Y.S.2d 275 (1st Dep't 1978).
It also should be noted that, even where a fact issue may be resolved by bringing the
informant into the trial, disclosure of his identity still may be denied where the truth can be
reached in another fashion. See People v. Jones, 58 App. Div. 2d 657, 396 N.Y.S.2d 61 (2d
Dep't 1977); People v. Wills, 48 App. Div. 2d 935, 370 N.Y.S.2d 22 (2d Dep't 1975).
"I "Undoubtedly the strongest case for disclosure is made out when it appears that the
informant was an eyewitness or a participant in the alleged crime." People v. Goggins, 34
N.Y.2d 163, 169-70, 313 N.E.2d 41, 44, 356 N.Y.S.2d 571, 576, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1012
(1974); see People v. Rodriguez, 62 App. Div. 2d 929, 403 N.Y.S.2d 275 (1st Dep't 1978);
People v. Banks, 45 App. Div. 2d 1024, 358 N.Y.S.2d 201 (2d Dep't 1974). Where the role of
the informant is to introduce the parties to the sale, disclosure usually has been ordered.
People v. Goggins, 34 N.Y.2d at 170, 313 N.E.2d at 45, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 576; People v. Rivera,
53 App. Div. 2d 819, 385 N.Y.S.2d 537 (1st Dep't 1976). But"see People v. Lee, 39 N.Y.2d
388, 348 N.E.2d 579, 384 N.Y.S.2d 123 (1976); People v. Pena, 37 N.Y.2d 642, 339 N.E.2d
149, 376 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1975); People v. Garcia, 51 App. Div. 2d 329, 381 N.Y.S.2d 271 (1st
Dep't 1976). Where an informant "did not set up" or participate in or was not present at the
drug sale, however, disclosure may be refused. See People v. Leyva, 38 N.Y.2d 160, 172, 341
N.E.2d 546, 554, 379 N.Y.S.2d 30, 40 (1975); cf. People v. Hawkins, 49 App. Div. 2d 181, 374
N.Y.S.2d 182 (4th Dep't 1975) (disclosure granted though informant involved only in a
"preliminary function").
As the cases indicate, the informant's role in the crime would seem inherently unreliable
as a factor to be considered in whether disclosure is warranted on the identification question.
The informant may be of negligible help on the identity question notwithstanding that he
was an eyewitness to the drug sale, as when there is a quick sale in a dark, crowded public
bar. On the other hand, he may be able to identify the defendant even if he had no role in
the sale and never before dealt with him, as where an informant waits outside an apartment
during a sale and views the departing defendant in a well-lit corridor.
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By finding a second distinct ground on which to base disclosure in
Peltak, however, the Court expanded the Goggins rule. Disclosure
was granted even though the state presented the credible testimony
of three officers, and the informants neither witnessed nor participated in the crime. 2 3 Another significant consequence of Peltak is
that once the defendant makes an "initial showing" that disclosure
is warranted, the prosecution has the onus of persuading the court
otherwise. 214 Previously, the Goggins rule was always interpreted as
placing on the defendant the burden of proving that the informant's
potential testimony may be relevant to guilt or innocence.2 1 5 Unfortunately, the Court did not clearly indicate the quantum of evidence
which will be necessary to make out an "initial showing."
Consistent with the traditional Goggins standard, the Peltak
Court focused on the evidence presented on behalf of the defendant
in determining whether to grant disclosure. 211 In its dictum, however, Peltak modified this procedure by suggesting that, at some
point, the burden is placed upon the prosecution to affirmatively
demonstrate a specific interest in withholding the informant's
identity.217 By stressing this requirement, it is submitted that the
Court may have overlooked the state's important concern with genfor informants as a matter of law-enforcement poleral21anonymity
icy. 8 Whether the Court's failure to emphasize the state's interest
22245 N.Y.2d at 906, 383 N.E.2d at 556, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 5.
214See text accompanying note 208 supra.
225Whether the Goggins rule, requiring relevance to the guilt or innocence of the defen-

dant before granting disclosure, is itself constitutionally permissible depends upon its conformity to the minimum standards for disclosure established by the Supreme Court in
Roviaro. See Pena v. LeFerve, 419 F. Supp. 112, 114 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (Roviaro guidelines were
intended to ensure constitutional right to a fair trial). Interestingly, the Roviaro Court expressed the rule in terms of relevancy to "the defense of an accused," 353 U.S. at 60-61, while
the Court of Appeals in Goggins spoke of relevancy to "guilt or innocence," 34 N.Y.2d at 170,
313 N.E.2d at 45, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 576. See notes 189 & 191 supra. The Goggins Court's
reference to guilt or innocence may be attributable to the fact that the Court was carefully
distinguishing the cases dealing solely with probable cause as opposed to actual trial of the
action. In any event, no constitutional challenge to the Goggins rule has been mounted on
this ground. The Supreme Court's formulation of the rule on disclosure, however, does seem
to lend itself to a slightly more favorable interpretation for the defendant, since disclosure of
informant testimony relevant to "the defense of an accused" but not clearly crucial to guilt
or innocence would seem to be due. It is suggested that if the Court of Appeals were to
interpret its Goggins mandate as being in fact coextensive with Rovairo, some of the harsh
results occasionally flowing from the "guilt or innocence" rule would be alleviated, thereby
eliminating the need for the new balancing test of Peltak.
26 See 45 N.Y.2d at 906, 383 N.E.2d at 556, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 5; text accompanying note
205 supra.
27 See 45 N.Y.2d at 906, 383 N.E.2d at 556, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 5; text accompanying notes
206-209, supra.
22I The anonymity privilege is designed to encourage citizens to report criminal acts to
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is attributable to its ruling that the Goggins standard was satisfied,
or whether it believed that such interest is minimal, must, regrettably, await further clarification.
Alan Sorkowitz

Police failure to permit defendant to contact mother violates right
to assistance of counsel, requiring suppressionof confession
Prearraignment or indictment statements elicited from an unrepresented defendant who voluntarily has waived his right to counsel 219 in the absence of an attorney are admissible against him. 2 °
the appropriate authorities and to cooperate in efforts to apprehend criminals. See Roviaro
v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957); M. HARNEY & J. CROSS, THE INFORMER iN LAw
ENFORCEMENT 100-06 (2d ed. 1968); 2 COLUM. J. OF L. & Soc. PROB. 47 (1966). While many
informants volunteer their aid to law enforcement officials in return for plea bargaining
concessions or recommendations for lighter sentences, see HARNEY & CROSS, supra, at 41-42,
it also is true that law-abiding citizens quite frequently serve as informants. Id. at 31-41.
Indeed, this tactic has proven particularly effective in the legal offensive against narcotics.
See id. at 26; Informant's Identity, supra note 188, at 562.
2I See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The defendant's right to counsel attaches upon the
commencement of "adversary judicial criminal proceedings" against him. Kirby v. Illinois,
406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972). In New York, this critical stage of the prosecution has been held to
commence at the time of indictment, People v. DiBiasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 549-51, 166 N.E.2d
825, 828-29, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21, 24-25 (1960), arraignment, People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162, 164,
182 N.E.2d 103, 104, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427, 428 (1962), and court-ordered prearraignment lineups,
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7 (1970); People v. Coleman, 43 N.Y.2d 222, 225-26, 371
N.E.2d 819, 822, 401 N.Y.S.2d 57, 59-60 (1977). See generally The Survey, note 258 infra.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that a defendant must be afforded the right to counsel
in any pretrial confrontation after indictment where there is a "potential [for] substantial
prejudice to defendant's rights . . . and . . . counsel [would be able] to help avoid that
prejudice." United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967); see Gilbert v. California, 388
U.S. 263 (1967).
220In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Court held that the prosecution may
not use statements elicited from a defendant under custodial interrogation unless, prior to
the questioning, the defendant had been advised of his sixth amendment right to counsel and
his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 444. According to Miranda,
however, a defendant may waive these rights outside the presence of an attorney if the waiver
is made voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly. Id. at 475; see Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.
387, 404 (1977); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
Under New York law, however, once an attorney has entered the proceedings, a waiver
by the defendant may be made only in the presence of his lawyer. People v. Hobson, 39
N.Y.2d 479, 481-82, 348 N.E.2d 894, 896, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 420 (1976), discussed in The
Survey, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 201, 216 (1976); see People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325,239 N.E.2d
537, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1968); People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243
N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963). Furthermore, following indictment or arraignment, the defendant may
not waive his right to counsel in the absence of an attorney. People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154,
162-63, 385 N.E.2d 612, 616, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874, 879 (1978), discussed in The Survey, notes
258-286 and accompanying text infra.

